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Abstract-
 
The world is undergoing a dramatic rapid 
transformation from isolated systems to ubiquitous Internet-
based-enabled ‘things’ capable of interacting each other and 
generating data that can be analyzed to extract valuable 
information. This highly interconnected global network 
structure known as Internet of Things will enrich everyone’s life, 
increase business productivity, improve government efficiency, 
and the list just goes on. However, this new reality (IoT) built 
on the basis of Internet, contains new kind of challenges from 
a security and privacy perspective. Traditional security 
primitives cannot be directly applied to IoT technologies due to 
the different standards and communication stacks involved. 
Along with scalability and heterogeneity issues, major part of 
IoT infrastructure consists of resource constrained devices 
such as RFIDs and wireless sensor nodes. Therefore, a flexible 
infrastructure is required capable to deal with security and 
privacy issues in such a dynamic environment. This paper 
presents an overview of IoT, security and privacy challenges 
and the existing security solutions and identifying some open 
issues for future research.
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I.
 
Introduction
 
he most profound technologies are those that 
disappear. They weave themselves into the fabric 
of everyday life until they are indistinguishable from 
it”. This was Mark Weiser’s central statement in his 
seminal paper [Weis 91] in Scientific American in 1991. 
IoT concept has begun to shape our modern world 
including a common man’s everyday life in the society, a 
world in which devices of every shape and size are 
manufactured with “smart” capabilities that allow them 
to
 
communicate and interact not only with other devices 
but also with humans, exchange their data, make 
autonomous decisions and perform useful tasks based 
on preset conditions. IoT is becoming well-known 
concept across many horizontal and vertical markets 
with its numerous applications [1].Just to give an 
example how IoT would affect our daily life: You enter 
the supermarket and receive your fridge’s text message: 
“You are out of milk.” In the dairy section, sensors signal 
your grocery cart that you’ve taken a milk carton. As you 
walk towards the pharmacy, your fitness wristband 
vibrates as it takes your vitals and streams the results to 
your doctor to adjust your prescription. When you’re 
finished shopping, you simply walk out the door. Your 
credit card is charged when you exit the supermarket’s 
geofence. As you drive home, your car communicates 
with other cars on the roadway to prevent accidents. 
The early years of Internet of Things (IoT) 
started with Machine to Machine (M2M) communication. 
M2M communication indicates two machines 
communicating with each other, usually without human 
involvement. The communication platform is not 
defined, and can be both wireless and wired 
communication. The term M2M stems from telephony 
systems. In these systems, different endpoints needed 
to exchange information between each other, such as 
the identity of the caller. This information was sent 
between the endpoints without a human being needed 
to initiate the transmission. The M2M term is still very 
much in use, especially in the industrial market, and is 
commonly regarded as a subset of IoT [5]. 
The term internet of things was devised by 
Kevin Ashton, cofounder and executive director of Auto-
ID Center at MIT in 1999 and refers to uniquely 
identifiable objects and their virtual representations in an 
“internet-like” structure [25]. The Oxford Dictionary 
perhaps offers a concise definition that invokes the 
Internet as an element of the IoT:  
Internet of things (noun): The interconnection via the 
Internet of computing devices embedded in everyday 
objects enabling them to send and receive data. 
Nevertheless, in the past decade, this concept 
has been extended because of new IoT network 
applications such as e-healthcare and transport utilities 
[25]. The evolution of the IoT has its origin in the 
convergence of wireless technologies, advancements of 
micro electromechanical systems (MEMS) and digital 
electronics where has been as a result miniature devices 
with the ability to sense and compute and communicate 
wirelessly. In the era of IoT, the interaction or relationship 
between humans and machines is ever more 
considered as machines getting smarter and starting to 
handle more human tasks, and in this situation humans 
T
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are required to trust the machine and feel safe. In this 
way, a thing might be a patient with a medical implant to 
facilitate real-time monitoring in a healthcare application 
or an accelerometer for movement attached to the cow 
in a farm environment [26]. 
These things or devices in IoT include familiar 
scannables and wearables and more complex systems 
like home appliances, vehicles, and smart roads and 
bridges. It is predicted that IoT will consist of 50 billion 
connected devices by 2020 and that the worldwide IoT 
market will be more than a $10 trillion industry. These 
projections depict the possibility of a smarter, efficient 
and safer world of inter-connected devices [27] while 
some observers show concerns that the IoT represents 
a darker world of surveillance, privacy and security 
violations, and consumer lock–in. Attention-grabbing 
headlines about the hacking of internet-connected 
automobiles, surveillance concerns arising from voice 
recognition features in “smart” TVs, and privacy fears 
stemming from the potential misuse of IoT data have 
captured public attention. This “promise vs. peril” 
debate along with an influx of information though 
popular media and marketing can make the IoT a 
complex topic to understand [22]. 
 
Figure 1: Hyper Cycle for Emerging Technologies, 2105[12]
Garter’s Hype Cycle is a way to represent 
emergence, adoption, maturity and impact on 
applications of specific technologies. The latest Gartner 
Hype Cycle for Emerging Technologies places it at the 
peak. IoT has been identified as one of the emerging 
technologies as shown below in the Hype Cycle in 
Emerging Technologies Report for the year 2015[28]. 
II. Security for Internet of Things 
If one thing can prevent the Internet of things 
from transforming the way we live and work, it will be 
a breakdown in security. While security considerations 
are not new in the context of information technology, the 
attributes of many IoT implementations present new and 
unique security challenges. Addressing these challen- 
ges and ensuring security in IoT products and services 
must be a fundamental priority. Users need to trust that 
IoT devices and related data services are secure from 
vulnerabilities, especially as this technology become 
more pervasive and integrated into our daily lives. 
Important challenge is the integration of security 
mechanisms and the user acceptance. User must feel 
that they control any information that is related to them 
rather than they feel they are being controlled by the 
system. This integration generates new requirements, 
not been previously considered. 
The interconnected nature of IoT devices means 
that every poorly secured device that is connected 
online potentially affects the security and resilience of 
the Internet globally. This challenge is amplified by other 
considerations like the mass-scale deployment of 
homogenous IoT devices, the ability of some devices to 
automatically connect to other devices, and the 
likelihood of fielding these devices in unsecure 
environments. As a matter of principle, developers and 
users of IoT devices and systems have a collective 
obligation to ensure they do not expose users and the 
IoT infrastructure itself to potential harm. Accordingly, a 
collaborative approach to security will be needed to 
develop effective and appropriate solutions to IoT 
security challenges that are well suited to the scale and 
complexity of the issues [22]. 
Full potential of the IoT depends on strategies 
that respect individual privacy choices across a broad 
spectrum of expectations. The data streams and user 
specificity afforded by IoT devices can unlock incredible 
and unique value to IoT users, but concerns about 
privacy and potential harms might hold back full 
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adoption of the Internet of Things. This means that 
privacy rights and respect for user privacy expectations 
are integral to ensuring user trust and confidence in the 
Internet, connected devices, and related services. Inde- 
ed, the Internet of Things is redefining the debate about 
privacy issues, as many implementations can drama- 
tically change the ways personal data is collected, 
analyzed, used, and protected. For example, IoT amp- 
lifies concerns about the potential for increased survei- 
llance and tracking, difficulty in being able to opt out of 
certain data collection, and the strength of aggregating 
IoT data streams to paint detailed digital portraits of 
users. While these are important challenges, they are 
not insurmountable. In order to realize the opportunities, 
strategies will need to be developed to respect 
individual privacy choices across a broad spectrum of 
expectations, while still fostering innovation in new 
technology and services [22]. 
The remainder of this paper is organized as 
follows: Section II further gives an overview of the IoT 
features, layers; we first identify properties that make the 
IoT unique in terms of the security and privacy 
challenges. In the next section, we describe the security 
primitives and solutions approaches that take into 
account to secure the network communication and 
protect user’s data. Finally, Section IV concludes the 
paper and gives insights regarding current research 
gaps and possible future directions. 
a) IoT Features And Security Requirements 
In this section, we identify the features that 
constitute the uniqueness of the IoT in terms of the 
security and privacy challenges and the layers of IoT. 
We will see how security issues are different in IoT as 
compared to traditional internet networks. Moreover, we 
will establish a number of security and privacy 
requirements, based on the described properties, and 
will discuss them in detail. 
 
Figure 2: Internet of Things Applications 
In contrast to traditional IT systems such as 
enterprise applications, cloud computing, and big data, 
a combination of a number of properties makes the IoT 
unique in terms of the challenges that need to be coped 
with. We identify these properties by analyzing related 
IoT research [29]–[30]. A major barrier to realizing the 
full promise of IoT is that around 85% of existing things 
were not designed to connect to Internet and cannot 
share data with the cloud according to IMS research. 
Addressing this issue, gateways from mobile, home, 
and industrial act as intermediaries between legacy 
things and the cloud, providing the needed connectivity, 
security and manageability described by Intel. 
The identified distinguishing properties are four, namely: 
the uncontrolled environment, the heteroge- neity, the 
need for scalability, as well as the constrained resources 
utilized in the IoT
 
Uncontrolled Environment: 
 
Many things will be part of a 
highly uncontrolled environment; things travel to 
untrustworthy surroundings, possibly without supervi-
 
sion. Sub properties of the uncontrolled environment 
     Stable network connectivity and constant 
presence cannot be expected in such an environment. 
 
Physical Accessibility: In the IoT, sensors can be 
publicly accessible, e.g., traffic control cameras, and 
environmental sensors.
 
Trust:
 
A priori trusted relationships are unlikely for the 
large amount of devices interacting with each other and 
users [22]. Thus, automated mechanisms to measure 
and manage trust of things, services, and users are 
crucial for the IoT.
 
Heterogeneity:
 
IoT is expected to be a highly 
heterogeneous ecosystem as it will have to integrate a 
multitude of things from various manufacturers. 
Therefore, version compatibility, and interoperability 
have to be considered. 
 
Scalability:
 
The vast amount of interconnected things in 
the IoT demands highly scalable protocols. This also 
has an influence on security mechanisms. For instance, 
centralized approaches, e.g., hierarchical Public Key 
Infrastructures (PKIs), as well as some distributed 
approaches, e.g., pairwise symmetric key exchange 
schemes, cannot scale with the IoT. 
A Review on Internet of Things (Iot): Security and Privacy Requirements and the Solution Approaches
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Mobility:
Infrastructures (PKIs), as well as some distributed 
approaches, e.g., pairwise symmetric key exchange 
schemes, cannot scale with the IoT.  
Constrained Resources: Things in the IoT will have 
constraints that need to be considered for security 
mechanisms. This includes energy limitations, e.g., 
battery powered devices, as well as low computation 
power, e.g., micro sensors. Thus, heavy computational 
cryptographic algorithms cannot be applied to all things. 
IoT and traditional network security issues are different 
in many ways. IoT is composed of RFID nodes and 
WSN nodes, whose resources are limited, while the 
Internet is composed of PC, severs, smart phones 
whose resources are rich. In the Internet, we use 
combinations of complex algorithms and lightweight 
algorithms to maximize security with less considerations 
of resource usage such as computation power. While in 
IoT, most of the cases, we can only use lightweight 
algorithms to find the balance between security and 
power consumptions. Connection between IoT nodes 
are always through slower, less secure wireless media, 
which results in easy data leakage, easily node 
compromising and all other insecure issues. Whereas in 
Internet, most communications are through faster, more 
secure wire or wireless communications. Even with the 
Mobile Internet, wireless connections are built on top of 
complex secure protocols which are almost impossible 
to implement for resource limited IoT nodes.  
Although there are various devices in the 
Internet, but with the abstraction of operating system, 
their data formats are almost the same with Window 
Family and Unix-like operating systems. However, in IoT, 
what we have is just bare wireless node. There is no 
operating system, just a simple embedded program for 
the chip. With the diversity of nodes perception goal, 
there comes different chip hardware which result in 
heterogeneous data contents and data formats. There 
are all kinds of IoT applications in application layer, used 
in our everyday life; they gather our private information 
every second automatically to make our life easier. 
These applications can even control our everyday life 
environment. It would be of great potential security 
problems if we lose control of IoT system. While in the 
Internet, if we do not provide our information ourselves, 
there is no way for attackers to get our information. And 
with the help of operating system and plenty of security 
software, the environment is more secure.  
So in one word, IoT system lives in a more 
dangerous environment with limited resources and less 
network guards. So we need to implement lightweight 
solutions to deal with this more dangerous environment. 
b) Internet of Things Layers 
In order to analyze the security issues of IoT in 
more detail, IoT layers are divided into perception layer, 
transportation layer and application layer. Perception 
layer can further be divided into perception nodes and 
perception network, divide transportation layer into 
access network, core network, and LAN, and the 
application layer into application support layer and IoT 
applications.  
Each layer has a corresponding technical 
support, these technologies at all levels play 
irreplaceable roles, but these techniques are more or 
less related to the existence of the range problems that 
can cause insecurity, privacy and other security issues 
of data. IoT must ensure the security of all layers. In 
addition, IoT security should also include the security of 
whole system crossing the perception layer, 
transportation layer and application layer.  
• Perception layer includes RFID security, WSNs 
security, RSN security and any others.  
• Transportation layer includes access network 
security, core network security and local network 
security. There are 3G access network security, Ad-
Hoc network security, WiFi security and so on for 
these sub layers. Different network transmission has 
different technology.  
• Application layer includes application support layer 
and specific IoT applications. The security in 
support layer includes middleware technology 
security, cloud computing platform security and so 
on. IoT applications in different industries have 
different requirements. 
Perception layer is mainly about information 
collection, object perception and object control. 
Perception Network that communicates with 
transportation network. Perception node is used for data 
acquisition and data control, perception network sends 
collected data to the gateway or sends control 
instruction to the controller. Perception layer 
technologies include RFID, WSNs, RSN, GPS, etc. 
c) LOT Security and Privacy Requirements  
Security and privacy are crucial enabling 
technologies and thus among the biggest challenges for 
the IoT [31]. Therefore, it is compelling for the IoT 
architectures to consider and resolve these challenges 
upfront. Otherwise, applications as well as whole 
ecosystems building on top of such architectures may 
repeat the security fallacies of the past decades. For 
that, a precise understanding of security requirements in 
the context of the IoT is indispensable. 
Prior technology trends, e.g., cloud computing 
and big data, are likely to share security requirements 
with the IoT. However, the uniqueness of the IoT 
introduces new challenges to security requirements, 
different from previous technology trends. Big data 
solutions for instance are designed to scale and deal 
with heterogeneity of data sources. Nevertheless, big 
data solutions are not required to deal with an 
uncontrolled environment and constrained resources; 
big data analytics run in isolated silos with time or 
resources to spare. Likewise, cloud computing by 
A Review on Internet of Things (Iot): Security and Privacy Requirements and the Solution Approaches
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design is supposed to scale and overcome challenges 
of constrained resources. However, cloud computing 
hardly deals with mobility of devices and physical 
accessibility of sensors. Related IoT security surveys are 
incomplete with respect to requirements. To provide a 
comprehensive overview, we summarize these security 
requirements from the domain of the IoT and split them 
into five groups: Network Security, Identity Management, 
Privacy, Trust, and Resilience. It is obvious that with 
regard to network security the constrained resources 
should have the strongest connection, mainly due
 
to the 
restrictions that they apply to traditional security 
mechanisms, e.g., cryptography. Moreover, identity 
management is influenced by the heterogeneity of the 
IoT. Privacy is mostly connected with scalability and the 
constrained resources as restrictions are posed to the 
technology candidates that can be utilized. Furthermore, 
the uncontrolled environment and the heterogeneity of 
the IoT have a serious impact on trust. Lastly, resilience 
is directly connected to the need of the IoT for scalability 
[23].
 Network Security:
 
Network security requirements are 
divided into confidentiality, authenticity, integrity, and 
availability [34]. Factors like heterogeneity and 
constrained resources must be considered while 
applying these to IoT architectures. Interconnecting the 
devices require to have better confidentiality so 
technologies such as IPSec [35] and Transport Layer 
Security (TLS) [33] are employed to meet this 
requirement. There’s another dedicated secure network 
stacks of IoT available in case overhead exceeds the 
resource constraints of things [32]. Authenticity confirms 
that the connection established is with an authenticated 
entity and authenticity also includes integrity of data but 
can be required separately to detect and recover failures 
so mechanisms such as TCP and TLS suffice this 
requirement.
 Privacy:
 
Privacy is considered to be one of main 
challenges in IoT [24] due to the involvement of humans 
and increasingly ubiquitous data collection. Privacy of 
data includes confidential data transmission in a way 
that it shouldn’t expose undesired properties, e.g. 
identity of a person. This requirement is considered as 
big challenge as almost every other sensing device 
collect personal information and large amount of such 
data becomes Personally Identifiable Information (PII) 
when combined together; enough to identify a person 
[38]. 
 A single person not being identifiable as the 
source of data or an action is anonymity, another 
challenge to face in IoT as mobile devices and wearable 
sensors may leak PII such
 
as IP addresses and location 
unknowingly. There are some technologies already 
being employed such as anonymous credentials and 
onion routing, though may not scale well with IoT. 
Unlinkability protects from profiling in the IoT while 
pseudonyms may solve unlink ability. With 
pseudonymity, actions of a person are linked with a 
pseudonym, a random identifier, rather than an identity 
[23].
 Intel Security also announced, its Enhanced 
Privacy Identity (EPID) technology will be promoted to 
other silicon vendors. EPID has anonymity properties, in 
addition to hardware-enforced integrity, and is included 
in ISO and TCG standards. The EPID technology 
provides an on-ramp for other devices to securely 
connect to the Intel IoT Platform [1].
 Identity Management:
 
A comprehensive attention should 
be given for identity management in IoT due to the 
number of devices and the complex relationship 
between devices, services, owners and users [38]. 
Methods for authentication, authorization including 
revocation, and accountability or non-repudiation are 
required. There may be multiple domain scenarios in 
IoT, authorization solutions, e.g., Kerberos [13], assume 
a single domain that encloses devices, owners, users, 
and services. Therefore, new authorization solutions that 
work with un-trusted devices, allow delegation of access 
across domains, and capable of quick revocation are 
needed. Accountability in trust management ensures 
that every action is clearly bound to an authenticated 
entity, is another challenge in IoT. It must be capable to 
deal with huge amounts of entities, delegation of 
access, actions that span organizational domains along 
with continuous derivation of data.
 Resilience:
 
Resilience and robustness against attacks 
and failures becomes another important challenge due 
to large scale of devices. IoT architectures must provide 
mechanisms to proficiently select things, transmission 
paths, and services according to their robustness 
(failure/attack avoidance). Also, fail-over and recovery 
mechanisms must be provided to maintain operations 
under failure or attacks, and to return to normal 
operations [2].
 d)
 
Cryptographic Primitives Goals and Attack 
Techniques
 Cryptographic primitives are in general 
utilized to comply with the main security goals for 
exchanged messages and the system itself [3]. 
 Main security requirements are
  Confidentiality:
 
message only disclosed to 
authorized entities
 Integrity:
 
Original message is not tempered
 Authenticity:
 
message is sent from a genuine entity
 Availability:
 
system keeps serving its purpose and 
stays uninterruptedly available for legitimate entities
 It is also important to understand the attack techni-
ques in order to rationalize security mechanisms in 
communication protocols. Some important attacks 
with respect to IoT are: Eavesdropping: process of 
A Review on Internet of Things (Iot): Security and Privacy Requirements and the Solution Approaches
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overhearing an ongoing communication, i.e. is as 
well preliminary for launching next attacks. In 
wireless communication, everyone has in general 
access to the medium so takes less effort to 
launch as compared to wired communication. 
Confidentiality is a typical counter-measurement 
against eavesdropping but if keying material is not 
exchanged in secure manner, eavesdropper could 
compromise the confidentiality. Secure key 
exchange algorithms such as Diffe-Hellman (DH) 
are used. 
 
Impersonation:
 
a malicious party pretends to be a 
legitimate entity for instance by replaying a generic 
message, in order to bypass the aforementioned 
security goals.
 
MITM Attack:
 
Man-in-the-middle attack takes place when 
a malicious entity is on the network path of two genuine 
entities. Capable of delaying, modifying or dropping 
messages.  Interesting within the context of PKC, 
malicious entity doesn’t attempt to break the keys of 
involved parties but rather to become the falsely trusted 
MITM. 
 
DoS Attack:
 
targets the availability of a system that offers 
services, is achieved by exhaustingly consuming 
resources at the victim so that the offered services 
become unavailable to legitimate entities. A common 
way to launch this attack is to trigger expensive 
operations at the victim that consume resources such as 
computational power, memory bandwidth or energy. 
This attack is critical for constrained devices where 
existing resources are already scarce.
 
III.
 
Internet of Things Security Solutions 
Approaches
 Different approaches are being employed for secure End-to-End communication in WSNs and IoT, 
they can be classified into major research directions as 
follows
 
•
 
Centralized Approaches
 
•
 
Protocol-based Extensions and Optimizations
 
•
 
Alternative Delegation Architectures
 
•
 
Solutions that Require Special Purpose Hardware 
Modules
 
a)
 
Centralized Approaches
 
Centralized security solution approaches are 
considered as efficient and suitable for the resource-
constrained sensor networks but the common issue is 
the scalability of the key management; node must be 
pre-configured with shared keys of all entities before 
deployment. Some of the common centralized based 
approaches are SPINS (A centralized architecture for 
securing uni-
 
and multicast communication in constrain-
 
ed networks, composed of two security protocols; SNEP 
and µTESLA) and the Polynomial-based scheme 
(Polynomial schemes aim at simplifying the key 
agreement process in distributed sensor networks, main 
idea is to assign every node n a polynomial share F(n; y) 
derived from a secret symmetric bi-variate polynomial 
F(x; y). This allows any possible pair of nodes with a 
polynomial share to be able to establish a common 
secret) [3].
 b)
 
Protocol-based Extensions and Optimizations
 
Approaches such as compression aim at 
optimizing the protocol without breaking the security 
properties. There are several compression schemes 
proposed such as the compression of IPV6 header, 
extension headers, and UDP (User Datagram Protocol) 
header now standard in 6LoWPAN. Some of these 
approaches are Abbreviated DTLS Handshake (allows 
for a shorter handshake that reuses the state information 
from the previous session, in order to resume the 
session). TLS Session Resumption without Server-Side 
State where server does not hold any state required to 
resume a session rather server's encrypted state is 
offloaded during the handshake towards the client and 
in caching, TLS Cached Information extension allows for 
omitting cached information, such as these large 
certificate chains from the handshake. Compression of 
header information is an approach to reduce the 
transmission overhead of packets in constrained 
environments, 6LoWPAN defines already header 
compression mechanism for IP packets.
 
c)
 
Delegation-based Architectures
 
Delegate computationally intensive tasks, such 
as public-key-based operations involved in session 
establishments, to more powerful devices. Some 
important approaches are: 
 
Server-based Certificate Validation Protocol 
(SCVP), it enables a client to delegate the complex task 
of certificate validation or certificate path construction to 
a trusted server. SCVP server should be trusted.
 
Another delegation approach:
 
by Bonetto [4]. It 
delegates the public-key-based operations
 
to a more 
powerful device, such as the Gateway (GW). They 
describe the procedure for IKE session establishment, 
where the GW intercepts session establishment and 
pretends to be the end-point. After calculation of the 
session key, this key is handed over the constrained 
device and both peers can directly protect their 
communication with the session key. But in the vision of 
IoT, not always a trusted GW is present e.g. in the home 
automation scenario, constrained devices of different 
manufacturers might be present in the constrained 
network. 
 
Tiny 3-TLS [6]:
 
It requires a strong trust level between 
the constrained resource device and the GW, offloads 
expensive public-key-based operations to the GW. The 
constrained resource device trusts the GW and the 
unconstrained device authenticates itself to the GW and 
hence, GW trusts the unconstrained device. 
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constrained resource device trusts the GW and the 
unconstrained device authenticates itself to the GW and 
hence, GW trusts the unconstrained device.  
Consequently, Tiny 3-TLS assumes that by 
means of transitive trust the constrained device could 
trust the unconstrained device. Tiny 3-TLS distinguishes 
between partially and fully trusted GWs.  
Sizzle [7] implements a complete SSL-secured 
HTTP web server for constrained devices with support 
for ECC-based authentication. This approach, in 
contrast to previous delegation-based architectures, 
delegates only the task of adapting the underlying 
transport-layer protocol. This is achieved by terminating 
the incoming TCP connection at the GW and sending 
the payload via a UDP-based reliable protocol to the 
constrained device. Sizzle only allows for certificate-
based authentication towards powerful clients and does 
not implement certificate handling for constrained 
devices. 
Peer authentication and End-to-End data 
protection are crucial requirements to prevent 
eavesdropping on sensitive data or malicious triggering 
of harmful actuating tasks in the context of Internet of 
Things (IoT). Symmetric key cryptography such as AES 
provides fast and lightweight encryption and decryption 
on smart devices and their integrated hardware 
supports it as well. However, when number of devices 
connected becomes high, exchanging symmetric keys 
becomes a challenging task and an efficient scalable 
key establishment protocol is required. Asymmetric key 
cryptography is another method for key establishment at 
two ends, but it involves high computational overheads 
which are the main concerns for resource-constrained 
devices [9]. Sensors with low resources (energy, 
computation) are not meant to perform complex 
asymmetric cryptographic operations. 
Key establishment protocols are used to 
provide shared secrets between two or more parties, 
typically for subsequent use as private keys for a variety 
of cryptographic objectives [12]. These objectives are in 
turn used as security primitives for enabling various 
security protocols such as source authentication, 
integrity protection or confidentiality [8]. To afford 
interoperable network security between endpoints from 
independent network domains, variants of traditional 
End-to-End IP security protocols have recently been 
proposed for resource-constrained devices and the 
networks formed by them [9].  
• Protocol variants such as Datagram Transport Layer 
Security (DTLS) [14], HIP-DEX [15], and minimal 
IKEv2 [16] consider public-key cryptography in their 
protocol design. As public-key cryptography 
acquires significant computational processing and 
transmission overheads in resource-constrained 
network environments, research and standardization 
currently focuses to reduce the public-key related 
overheads during the protocol handshake. 
 •
 
Another interesting approach has been suggested 
in [20] and [8]. In these papers, a proxy-based 
solution is proposed to delegate the heavy 
cryptographic operations from a resource-
constrained device to less constrained nodes. A 
similar approach might be found in [11] for ambient-
assisted living and also in [21] where 
communication is made from one resource-
constrained node to another resource-constrained 
sensor node. These approaches have assumed the 
sensor nodes to be trustworthy and the mechanism 
in case if nodes are compromised, misbehave, 
authentication fails or nodes fail to deliver its 
assigned share. Still the risk involved is there for the 
secret shared key to be revealed by the attacker 
from the compromised nodes. Selection criteria are 
described for these assisting nodes to evaluate their 
abilities before they are assigned computational 
tasks to work as proxies.
 Other approaches proposed including session 
resumption mechanisms [17] and caching of static 
handshake information such as certificates [18]. 
However, the considerable RAM and ROM requirements 
make the use of public-key cryptography unsuitable for 
a wide range of constrained devices [9]. One such 
implementation of two-way authentication scheme for 
the IoT based on DTLS protocol is described in [19]. 
This approach even generates considerable overheads 
to the network traffic due to the utilization of X.509 
certificates and RSA public keys with DTLS handshake. 
Both these X.509 certificate and RSA public key with 
DTLS handshake involve heavy computations for the low 
performing and high resource-constrained sensor 
nodes.
 d)
 
Hardware-based Approaches
 A class of security solutions relies on additional 
hardware security modules, such as TPMs. A Trusted 
Platform Module (TPM) is tamper-proof hardware that 
provides support for cryptographic computations 
especially public-key-based cryptographic primitives. 
TPMs can hold keys, such as RSA private keys, in a 
protected memory area. Furthermore, the cryptographic 
accelerator of TPMs is capable of 
A Review on Internet of Things (Iot): Security and Privacy Requirements and the Solution Approaches
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Figure 2: Network Model Scenario for Body Area Network in the context of Internet of Things (IoT) 
 computing the cryptographic computations with a 
higher performance. In contrast, ECC provides the same 
level of security with considerably smaller key sizes [3]. 
Therefore, ECC is preferred and recommend for 
constrained environments.
IV. Conclusion
This paper aims to provides the reader a basic 
overview about Internet of Things, the major security and 
privacy challenges because of its exponential growth 
and what kind of security primitives and solution 
approaches are being taken to make communication 
secure and to protect the user’s data. Conventional 
security primitives cannot be applied due to the 
heterogeneous nature of sensors, low resources and the 
system architecture in IoT applications. To prevent 
unauthorized use of user’s data, protect their privacy 
and to mitigate security and privacy threats, strong 
network security infrastructures are required. Peer 
authentication and End-to-End data protection are 
crucial requirements to prevent eavesdropping on 
sensitive data or malicious triggering of harmful 
actuating tasks. Any unauthorized use of data may 
restrict users to utilize IoT based applications. This 
review paper provides the security solution approaches 
been proposed recently identifying both the challenges 
related to security and privacy and the attack techniques 
used to compromise/fail the sensor nodes in Internet of 
Things as well. Current approaches are focused on pre-
deployed, pre-shared keys on both ends whereas 
certificate-based authentication is generally considered 
infeasible for constrained resource sensors. New 
security paradigm are needed for End-to-End secure 
key establishment protocols that are lightweight for 
resource-constrained sensors and secure through 
strong encryption and authentication.
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